This study explores location choices for investors stemming from emerging economies (often referred to as the South), with a particular emphasis on institutions and natural resources.
Introduction
The share of developing and transition countries in the global foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows has doubled in the last 20 years, reaching 16% of the total FDI outward stock. Most of this increase has happened since 2004 (UNCTAD, 2010) . This process has not only been driven by an active role of China, whose share amounts to 8.5 percent of the total FDI stemming from the South. 4 Other important investors are Brazil, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Singapore and the UAE, who together account for almost 80 percent of the total FDI outflows from the South in 2010. Most of the investment flows from developing countries go to other developing and transition economies, giving rise to the term "South-South FDI" and amounting to one-third of the total FDI inflows in emerging economies (Aykut and Ratha, 2004) . The appearance of these new global investors has been described as a "huge infusion" or a "bonanza" in the popular media, reflecting large amounts that are being invested. It has naturally raised a number of important questions regarding their strategies and motivations, as well as implications for investors from the North.
Given the novelty of the subject and scarcity of the data, the academic literature about FDI stemming from the South is very limited and most existing papers are either descriptive or have a regional focus (Aykut and Ratha, 2004; UNCTAD, 2006; Buckley et al., 2007; Bera and Gupta, 2009 ). To our knowledge, there are only two studies that include investors from the South in their analysis of FDI determinants: Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) who relies on the FDI flows data, but restricts his sample to one year, and Darby et al. (2009) The contribution of this paper is the following. First, we construct a novel dataset that combines information on bilateral FDI flows for 60 developing and 22 developed economies between 1996 and 2007, covering 85 percent of the world FDI flows. Second, relying on this dataset, we investigate whether investors from the South invest differently from their counterparts from the North. Besides traditional determinants of FDI, a particular attention is paid to the institutional distance between source and destination countries, and endowment with natural resources. Third, having attested to differences between these investors, we inquire into the consequences of South FDI for investors from the North by studying the relationship between them. As we explain further, such test of substitution or complementarity can be considered as additional approach to explore differences and similarities between investors from the South and the North.
The focus on institutional distance is motivated by a recent evidence showing that investors are not only discouraged by bad institutions in host countries, but are also deterred by an institutional distance between origin and destination countries as they prefer to invest in countries with a similar institutional environment (Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2007; Habib and Zurawicki, 2002) . These studies are performed on a sample of developed economies, but their results imply that investors from the South may have a comparative advantage to invest in other developing countries (Claessens and Van Horen, 2009 ). Indeed, they may be eager and more able to operate in institutionally weak environments thanks to their previous domestic experience with poor institutions (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; Darby, 2009) , as well as greater familiarity of business practices in similar markets (the World Bank, 2006) . Such a hypothesis could provide a very plausible explanation for the recent surge in South-South FDI. We extend this literature by explicitly testing the above hypothesis on a sample of investors from the South. Moreover, we argue that in the setting of the multitude of investors originating both from the North and the South, one cannot consider institutional distance between origin and destination countries in absolute terms, as it is done in the earlier literature. This is because such treatment implies a symmetric preference for worse and for better institutions, an assumption that may result in misleading conclusions. We show that more insight can be gained if one rather differentiates between flows to countries with better and with worse institutions.
Further, our focus on the endowment with natural resources is propelled by their growing strategic importance owing to an increased demand and soaring prices, which motivated emerging economies to intensify efforts to acquire oil assets and invest in mining (UNCTAD, 2007) . 5 To mitigate the domestic shortage of natural resources, the Chinese government has promoted outward FDI for resource exploration projects via preferential bank loans of the Export-Import Bank of China. As a result, between 2003 and 2005, the mining 5 Despite the fact that companies from developing and transition economies now control most of the global production of oil and gas, their degree of internationalization is still relatively modest. Among five largest emerging country multinationals, only CNPC/PetroChina has any production abroad (17 percent of its total production). In comparison, the top privately owned oil multinationals from developed countries, ExxonMobil and BP, have at least 80 percent of their production in foreign countries.
industry has accounted for 32 percent of the total outward Chinese FDI, albeit its share has decreased afterwards. The government of India has also mandated its state-owned oil companies to secure stakes in oversea oil deposits. While Russia does not need to secure resources for its own demand, it has still engaged in the competition for resources in the postsoviet republics with the aim of selling them in international markets. 6 Other important emerging investors in the primary sector are Brazilian, Kuwaiti and Malaysian enterprises.
Importantly, companies from the South that invest in the primary sector are almost always state-owned and, hence, they could be influenced by considerations other than economic. These investors appear to be less deterred by poor institutions in host countries than large private multinationals from developed countries (UNCTAD, 2007 has an asymmetric effect, depending on whether receiving countries possess better or worse institutions than origin countries. Those investors from the South that invest in countries with better institutions choose countries with the best possible institutions. Despite unfamiliarity, such an institutional environment is the most transparent for potential entrants due to the low corruption, sound property rights, and political stability. Alternatively, when investors from the South invest in countries with worse institutions than at home, institutional distance deters them, confirming earlier evidence for investors from the North. Most importantly, however, the growing attractiveness of the primary sector appears to outweigh the deterring effects of bad institutions in destination countries that are endowed with the largest natural resources.
The emergence of large investors from the South may be viewed as taking away potential investment opportunities that could have been undertaken by investors from the 6 Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, for instance, are large producers and exporters of natural gas, but they find it difficult to export due to restrictions on their access to the Russian Federation transit pipelines.
North i.e. crowding them out. 7 However, we attest to numerous differences between investors from the South and the North, suggesting that investors from the South could be attracted by other types of activities or sectors, and hence, these flows could be rather complementary.
This would be good news for investors from developed economies, but also for developing receiving countries, who would see different investment opportunities grasped by different investors, rather than emerging multinationals competing head-to-head with their counterparts from the North to earn market share. We test and confirm this hypothesis for the case of developing receiving countries.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical predictions and empirical evidence on determinants of FDI; Section 3 presents our empirical methodology; Section 4 explains data collection and summary statistics. Sections 5 describe our empirical findings and Section 6 concludes.
2.
What Makes FDI from the South Different?
Institutional determinants
Traditional literature on FDI has paid a particular attention to the importance of institutions in attracting FDI, suggesting several reasons why their quality may matter. In line with the growth literature, good economic institutions, such as property rights and rule of law, increase incentives to invest and improve allocation of resources (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Kaufmann and Kraay, 2002; Rodrik et al., 2004) . This leads to higher growth prospective and, hence, renders a country more attractive for foreign investors. Second, poor institutional environment, such as corruption, brings additional costs to FDI (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Wei, 2000) . Third, FDI have very high sunk costs, which makes investors reluctant to enter foreign markets, unless they can write binding long-term contracts to decrease all types of uncertainty, and, hence, government stability, and institutions enabling contract enforcement are especially important (Naudé and Krugell, 2007; Busse and Hefeker, 2007) . If contracts and property rights are well-enforced, each agent will be able to recoup its investment to a greater degree (Levchenko, 2007) . The empirical literature supports these theoretical
predictions and numerous studies demonstrate that strong institutions of host countries attract FDI (Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Daude and Stein, 2007) ; however most of these studies have been done with the focus on developed origin countries.
7 Hillary Clinton, the US secretary of state, has noted that some developing countries are making "disturbing" gains in the Latin American region. She said that the US was competing for attention and relationships with at least the Russians, the Chinese and the Iranians (The Economist, 2009).
Poor institutional quality of potential host countries is often cited as the leading explanation for the scarcity of capital flows to poor countries predicted by the standard neoclassical theory -the "Lucas Paradox" (Lucas, 1990; Alfaro et al, 2008; Papaioannou, 2009 ). Thus, the above literature does not provide an explanation for the emerging phenomenon of the South-South FDI. To understand the role of institutions in the capital flows between developing economies, one should rather look at studies of Habib and Zurawicki (2002) and Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) , who propose to consider not only institutions in host countries, but also an institutional distance between the origin and the destination countries. They adopt the notion of "psychic distance", which asserts that companies choose to enter markets perceived to be psychologically closer, because these countries present lower level of uncertainty, and psychic closeness facilitates learning from host countries. In line with this hypothesis, they find that a larger institutional distance deters foreign investors. While these studies analyze a sample of investors from mostly developed economies, their results imply that emerging investors from the South that are familiar with weak institutions may have a comparative advantage in investing in other developing economies that suffer from corruption and political instability. To the best of our knowledge, the only paper that studies the role of institutional distance on the sample that includes developing countries is Claessens and Van Horen (2008) , but their study is restricted only to the banking FDI. They also report a deterring effect of a large institutional distance.
While not directly analyzing institutional distance, there are some studies that attest to the diminishing negative effects of bad host institutions if investors have earlier experience with poor institutional environment. Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) show that investors from countries with high corruption and the lack of enforcement of anticorruption laws select similar countries when they internationalize in order to exploit their familiarity with corrupt environments and also because they face lower costs of operating as opposed to other investors. 8 Darby et al (2009) It is important to note, too, that earlier papers rely on a measure of institutional distance, computed as an absolute difference between institutions in origin and destination countries, assuming that better or worse institutions have a similar deterring effect. Finding such assumption unrealistic, we relax it by introducing the notions of positive (home institutions are better than host institutions) and negative institutional distance (home institutions are worse than host institutions). Whereas we presume that institutional distance plays a deterring role when institutions in destination countries are worse than at home (in line with previous studies), we hypothesize that a larger institutional distance should not harm and could even attract investors when institutions in destination countries are better than at home.
Despite unfamiliarity, such an institutional environment is the most transparent for potential entrants due to the rule of law (the quality of contract enforcement and property rights), low level of corruption, sound and unobtrusive regulation that promotes private initiative, high accountability, good quality of public services, and political stability. This also reflects "assets seeking FDI" as investors purchase multinationals with famous brands and the latest technologies, which are more likely to develop in institutionally friendly environments.
Institutions and resources
As it was discussed in the Introduction, growth of FDI from the South has recently been driven by investment in natural resources. Interestingly, most developing countries that are endowed with natural resources have a very poor quality of institutions and, hence, it is necessary to look at the sources of this negative correlation. Most of the explanations, found in the literature, relate to the rents that are generated due to natural resources exploitation and that are easily appropriated. A "rentier effect" occurs, because revenues from the export of fuels and minerals allow governments to mollify dissent (buy off critics through lavish infrastructure projects or outright graft) and avoid accountability pressures (because taxes are low), increase incentives for corruption, as well as discourage the introduction of better institutions, because they would erode the political advantage and future rents of the incumbents (Acemoglu et al., 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Robinson et al., 2006) . Numerous studies also show that natural resources income is one of the leading determinants of the probability of wars and of the conflict duration Ross, 2004; with harmful effects on the quality of the legal system and, thus, on property rights (van der Ploeg, 2010).
The above rent-seeking models are confirmed by a number of empirical studies.
Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2009) rely on a dataset covering 99 countries during 1980-2004
and find that natural resources induce corruption in countries that have endured a nondemocratic regime for a long time. Isham et al. (2003) stress that certain types of natural resources, such as oil and diamonds, have a particularly weakening effect on institutional capacity. In a quasi-experimental study, Brollo et al. (2010) argue that windfall government revenues worsen the functioning of institutions by reducing the degree of political accountability and deteriorating the quality of elected officials as well. Vicente (2010) document an increase in corruption of 10 percent after the announcements of the oil discovery in São Tomé.
Such a close nexus between institutions and resources requires a simultaneous examination of the impact of institutions and endowment with natural resources, leading otherwise to a serious omitted variable bias. Surprisingly, very few papers address this issue.
Exploring sector level data, albeit for one source country, Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2010) show that subsoil assets boost resource FDI, but crowd out non-resource FDI, leading to the lower aggregate amount of foreign investment in countries endowed with natural resources.
They attribute their results to the "resource curse", but find no effect of institutions on non-resource FDI. Relying on country level data, Asiedu (2006) studies the impact of natural resources and bad host institutions on FDI in Africa and concludes that both factors are important in explaining FDI.
In this study, we show the effect of omitting and including natural resources as a determinant of FDI along with the institutions. The results suggest that the joint treatment of these variables is justified.
Complementarity vs substitution
Given To the best of our knowledge, no study has explored a potential substitution or complementarity between South-South FDI and the ability of developed economies to invest in the South. 10 Methodologically, such a study would be related to the literature on the impact of FDI on domestic investment (Borensztein et al. 1998; Agosin and Machado, 2005) . It would also be linked to a more recent literature that looks at the effect of emerging large FDI recipients, such as China, on the amount of FDI received by other developing countries (Eichengreen and Tong, 2007; Fung et al., 2008; Garcia-Herrero and Santabarbara, 2007; Mercereau, 2005 
The Data
To address these issues, we construct a novel comprehensive database of bilateral annual data on FDI inflows that, in addition to developed countries, the North, encompasses a significant number of investing countries from the South.
The data for developed countries come from the OECD statistics; while for other countries we use bilateral FDI inflow data from national sources, ASEAN, and UNCTAD (for Over the studied period, there has been a considerable increase in the total amount of FDI inflows (Figure 1) . Notably, the amount of investment from the South has been increasing, too, almost doubling between the middle and the end of the considered period.
Distinguishing by sub-categories of both investing and receiving countries, the FDI flows from North to North represent half of the total FDI amount of our sample, even though there are only 14.8% of North-North country-pairs in the sample (Table 1) . In contrast, South-South investments account for 14.5% of the total FDI amount, while South-South relationship is observed in 41% of the sample. In turn, North-South FDI represent 18.4% of the total FDI flows, while South countries invest relatively little into the North (3.6% of the total volume).
Our analysis excludes inflows from islands and countries classified as tax heavens or offshore financial centers.
For the second part of the paper, we additionally construct a panel dataset of receiving The data on institutions are from the World Bank Governance Matters database, described in Kaufmann et al (2010) . We work with six available measures of institutional quality -voice and accountability; political stability and lack of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control for corruption. By relying on simple averages of these indicators, we construct annual differences between mean institutions in source and destination country. Based on these data, we construct a measure of institutional distance as an absolute distance between institutions in origin and destination countries. To differentiate between FDI in host countries with better or worst institutions than at home, we construct two additional measures. Positive (negative) institutional distance is equal to an absolute institutional difference between origin and destination countries when institutions at home are better/worse than in the host country, and zero otherwise. Please note that a positive institutional distance refers always to the investment in countries with worse institutions, i.e.
it is "positive" because institutions of the origin countries are superior.
The countries of our database exhibit a significant variation in institutional quality. As shown in Table 1 
Methodology and Results

a) Institutions and other Determinants of Bilateral FDI: are investors from the South different?
To estimate the differences in the investment behavior of investors from the South and North, we rely on the gravity equation, which has become very common in the application to bilateral FDI (Bénassy-Quéré et. al, 2007; Daude and Stein, 2007; Javorcik et al., 2011) .
In our initial specification, we follow earlier literature that estimates the effect of absolute institutional distance on FDI. To see a differential impact for developing and developed source countries, we interact institutional distance with a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if source country is located in the North. Hence, we estimate the following model:
where ‫ܫܦܨ‬ ௦ௗ௧ is bilateral uni-directional foreign direct investment from a source Moreover, this allows us to control for the omission of term that Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) refer to as multilateral trade resistance. By definition, such an approach cannot be used in the analysis of the impact of host and home institutions, because these variables cannot be included into the regression such as (1). This provides an additional motivation to focus on institutional distance. Likewise, the dummy variable North is omitted from the regressions, even though we are able to keep the interaction term of this variable with the InstDiff variable.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper on institutional distance that includes time-variant source and destination country dummies and, thus, controls for all time-variant source and destination country effects, including home and host institutions.
The estimation results for this gravity equation are presented in Column 1 of Table 2 .
In these estimations, all standard gravity variables are correctly signed and significant at 1 percent level: geographic distance has a negative impact on FDI bilateral flows, while common border, language and colonial history exert a positive influence. The coefficient on the institutional distance should be interpreted as the impact of institutional distance on the FDI outflows from the South, while the sum of this coefficient with the interaction coefficient should be interpreted as the impact on the FDI outflows from the North. As we see, the sum is negative (and statistically significant at 1 percent), reflecting the fact that investors from developed economies prefer to invest in countries with a similar institutional environment.
This finding is in line with the results of Habib and Zurawicki (2002) However, in the current setting, it is not possible to see whether it is, in fact, better or worse institutions that stimulate the FDI from the South, because the absolute value of the distance is used.
To shed more light on this issue, in Column 2 of Table 2 , we disaggregate the absolute institutional distance into positive (when institutions in the source country are better than in the destination country) and negative institutional distance (when institutions in the source countries are worse than in the destination country). The idea behind this disaggregation is based on the hypothesis that the effect of positive and negative institutional distance is not symmetric, because investing in countries with much better institutions (large negative institutional distance) could be attractive. This disaggregation plays no role for investors from the North, who always prefer to invest in countries with similar institutions (as suggested by the negative and statistically significant coefficients on the disaggregated institutional distance interacted with the North dummy). In contrast, the disaggregation is important for investors from the South: our previous result that institutional distance plays a positive role for FDI from the South remains unchanged, but we note that it is fully driven by the positive institutional distance. In other words, investors from the South seem to be attracted by countries with the worst institutions. There is, however, no significant evidence that they are also attracted by best institutions.
12 Institutional distance may be correlated with differences in labor costs between countries. Thus, in the current setting, it may be worthwhile to control for labor cost differences, usually proxied by PPP-adjusted differences in GDP per capita. Unfortunately, these data are not available for half of the sample, and for the majority of South countries. We checked whether the simple current GDP per capita differences can be used instead, and found that the degree of correlation between this measure and institutional differences is actually only 0,13.
This finding that investors from the South pick countries with the worst institutions does not have a plausible explanation, unless we consider natural resources. As discussed in section 2, natural resources could be an important driver of FDI and its omission could bias the results owing to the negative relationship between natural resources endowment and institutions. To control for this, we split the sample into the South and North origin countries, and estimate specifications that include an interaction term between the availability of subsoil resources in host countries and positive or negative institutional distance:
where PosInstDiff (NegInstDiff) is the absolute difference in institutions between source and destination countries if institutions in a source country are better (worse) than institutions in a destination country and zero otherwise, Resources is the value of subsoil assets per capita in a destination country.
Our findings are presented in Table 3 and offer support to the hypothesis that availability of natural resources is an important determinant of FDI from the South and hence cannot be excluded from the estimation. Moreover, controlling for resources changes the signs and significance of the coefficients on institutions, suggesting that omitting this variable indeed biases the results. Columns (1)-(2) of Table 3 contain the results of the baseline specification.
Our results lead us to the following conclusions. First, when investors from the South invest in countries with better institutions (negative institutional distance between source and destination country), we observe that a large institutional distance has a positive effect as these investors are attracted by countries with the best institutions. As discussed in Section 2, despite unfamiliarity, such an institutional environment is the most transparent for potential entrants due to the rule of law and low level of corruption. Interestingly, this motive also applies to investors from the North when they invest in other economies with better institutions than at home.
Second, when investors from the South invest in countries with worse institutions (positive institutional distance between source and destination country), they choose countries 13 Since we include time-varying source and destination country dummies, the variable for natural resources is dropped in the estimation. But it is preserved in the interaction terms with institutional distance.
that are similar in terms of institutional quality. Thus, the implications of previous studies about the deterring role of the institutions are borne out by our estimations for the sample of investors from the North. More generally, our finding that investors from the South prefer to invest in countries with similar institutional environment explains a recent rise in South-South FDI.
Third, those investors from the South that invest in countries with worse institutions are less deterred by an institutional distance when host countries are endowed with a large wealth of natural resources. If we rely on the coefficients in column 5, we find that countries possessing natural resources that are worth more than 4675 USD per capita (top 10 percent of our sample) will attract FDI from investors from the South despite a large institutional distance. To name a few, this concerns such countries as Algeria, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Venezuela. Importantly, the interaction between institutional distance and resources is not significant for investors from the North, which are consistently deterred by worse institutions, despite the availability of resources.
Finally, we observe that certain traditional determinants, such as common border and common language, have a much larger impact on investors from the South than investors from the North. While these findings corroborate previous cursory observations of the regional aspect of the South FDI (Aykut and Ratha, 2004; UNCTAD, 2006; BCG Report, 2006) , out study is the first attempt to test this hypothesis formally within the gravity model framework.
We provide a number of robustness tests. First, as noted by Aykut and Ratha (2004) , Chinese inward FDI flows are often overstated due to round tripping, as Chinese firms move money offshore and then bring it back to China disguised as FDI. To correct for this bias, we estimate our model excluding China as both source and destination country (Columns 3-4).
Second, acknowledging potential endogeneity of institutions, we additionally replace
PosInstDiff and NegInstDiff with differences in initial institutions for the year 1996 (PostInstDiff1996, NegInstDiff1996), the earliest date available in the Kaufman database, and present the estimation results in Column (5-6). This last specification is our preferred one, because it is the strictest, and because the result for the North investing countries is fully in line with the earlier studies.
b) Complements or substitutes?
The analysis in the previous section allows us to conclude that emerging country investors behave differently from investors from developed economies. Geographic and linguistic distance appears to be a larger obstacle for the former ones, while important differences also exist vis-à-vis institutional distance and resource attractiveness. Given such differences, we would like to see whether investment flows from the North and the South behave as complements or substitutes. This question is of particular importance for developing host countries where source countries both from the South and North are present.
To explore this issue, one can estimate the determinants of FDI at the aggregated level of destination countries, focusing only on South recipients, and cumulating, on a yearly basis, two broad types of foreign inflows: from the North and from the South. Following the Borensztein et al. (1998) methodology of studying the crowding-out effect of FDI on domestic investment, the estimated model would take the following form:
where ‫ܲܦܩ_ܫܦܨ‬ ௗ௧ is a ratio of total FDI to GDP in destination country d at time t, ‫ܲܦܩ_ܫܦܨ‪ℎ‬ݐݑܵ‬ ௗ௧ is the amount of foreign direct investment from South investors over GDP in country d at time t, µ t is a set of year fixed effects, and ‫ݏ݈ݎݐ݊ܥ‬ ௗ௧ is a set of determinants of FDI. Apart from traditional factors, such as the level of initial income, the level of initial human capital, government consumption, and host institutions (see also Mercereau, 2005) , we augment this specification by natural resources endowment. To see potential differences in North-South FDI relationship in resource-rich and resource-poor countries, we also interact South FDI flows with resources.
If aggregate FDI flows from the South simply augment total FDI, the coefficient on this variable should equal to one. However, if FDI flows from South investors augment total FDI more than one-to-one, in other words, if there is a complementary relationship between South and North FDI, the coefficient on this variable should be greater than one. By the same token, a coefficient below one would imply the substitution between two types of flows.
Estimation results based on this approach are summarized in Table 4 , column (1). The coefficient on South FDI is found to be significantly greater than one, while the interaction term is positive and also statistically significant. The effect of a marginal increase in South FDI, evaluated at the mean value of natural resources, on the overall share of FDI to GDP is of the order of 2.486. This suggests that in the absence of natural resources, aggregate South investment inflows increase aggregate total investment more than one for one, or that South FDI are complementary to North FDI. In the presence of natural resources, this complementary effect is actually amplified.
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The regression in Table 4 column (1) does not control for country fixed effects. This is deliberate, as we are interested in seeing the effect of standard determinants of FDI suggested by the literature, some of which do not vary over time. The non-inclusion of country fixed effects, however, may affect both the coefficients on these regressors and on ‫ܲܦܩ_ܫܦܨ‪ℎ‬ݐݑܵ‬ ௗ௧ , especially if some of the omitted country characteristics are correlated both with South and North FDI. We thus repeat the estimation controlling for country fixed effects (Table 4 , column 2). Indeed, both the coefficient on ‫ܲܦܩ_ܫܦܨ‪ℎ‬ݐݑܵ‬ ௗ௧ and the coefficient on the ‫ܲܦܩ_ܫܦܨ‪ℎ‬ݐݑܵ‬ ௗ௧ and resources are smaller than the coefficients obtained in column (1), suggesting that part of the positive bias has been eliminated by including these terms. Nevertheless, both the individual and the total effect of ‫ܲܦܩ_ܫܦܨ‪ℎ‬ݐݑܵ‬ ௗ௧ remain greater than one.
In addition to this, to control for the endogeneity of our variable of interest due to simultaneity, and also to test the complementarity hypothesis in the long run, we estimate specification (3) using the Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM estimator, which is a joint estimation of the equation in levels and in first differences. Adoption of this methodology is motivated by a similar application by Agosin and Machado (2005) to testing long-run complementarity between foreign and domestic investment. In column (3) of Table 4 , we embrace a specification that allows the current total amount of foreign investment to depend on the current and lagged value of South FDI, as well as on the lagged value of total investment. Given the time-invariance of resources, it is interacted only with the current level of South FDI. In column (4), we also inquire into a possible longer-term relationship, including two lags of the South and total investment variables. In both cases, we use year effects and previous GDP growth proxying returns on investment (Gastanaga, Nugent, and Pashamova, 1998) as instruments in GMM estimation. Both specifications fare well according to tests of first and second order serial correlation; and also Sargan test does not allow rejecting the null hypothesis of the validity of the instruments. Based on these two specifications, the computed complementarity effect between South and North FDI ranges from 2.372 to 3.375. 15 Given the careful treatment of endogeneity, we can attribute this result to crowding-in of investors from the North by investors from the South. The amplifying effect of natural resources endowment on this complementary relationship, however, is not robust.
Finally, to mitigate the volatility of yearly data, we also confirm these results in column (5), re-estimating equation (3) on cross-section data averaged for the studied period.
Despite small sample size, our results of complementarity between investment from the North and the South remain valid 16 .
Conclusions
While South-South FDI flows constitute one-third of total foreign investment in developing and transition economies, there has been a lack of a systematic study of the determinants and implications of such flows, mainly due to data limitations. We attempt to fill this gap by relying on our novel dataset of FDI flows and ask two simple questions: (1) Do foreign investors from the South behave differently than investors from the North; and (2) Do investment from the South serve as complement or substitute to the investment from the North?
We demonstrate that FDI from the South has a more regional exposure than investment from developed countries, as common border and common distance appear to be more important for the former investors. Whereas we confirm previous findings that large institutional distance deters investors from the North, the relationship between FDI and institutional distance is more complex for emerging economies. Our findings lead us to the following conclusions. First, when countries from the South invest in countries with better institutions, institutional distance can be viewed as a driving force. This is likely due to the . 16 Having considered the impact of the South FDI on the flows originating in the North, one can also wonder about the reverse impact, namely whether FDI from the North crowd-in or crowd-out investors from the South. To address this issue, we estimate Equation 4 with FDI from the North as an explanatory variable and our findings indicate a crowding-in effect as well. Thus, there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between FDI from the South and the North. This might appear surprising at first, because the estimated equations imply that an increase in USD1of the South FDI should lead to a larger increase of the total FDI and the same applies to an increase in the North FDI, which is not possible if total FDI are equal to the sum of FDI from the North and the South. However, such identity does not have to hold if we rely on lags of our explanatory variables, as is the case in specifications 2-3. In specifications 1 and 4, the above identity should hold for each country, but not in the cross-country context. For example, FDI flows from China to India could crowd-out an investor from the West in India, but motivate this investor to redirect its investment to another developing country. intellectual property, which are more likely to be found in good institutional environment.
Second, when emerging economies invest in countries with worse institutions, they are on average deterred by a large institutional distance, even though the effect is weaker in the case of South-South FDI. Third, such a negative effect of an institutional distance is outweighed by the appeal of natural resources, which appears to be a very important force behind FDI from the emerging economies that strive to secure the possession of subsoil resources.
Our analysis implies that countries with bad institutions do not necessarily have to improve their quality in order to attract investors. They may still see considerable investment inflows, albeit from a different type of investors and into different sectors, such as primary sector. This however can present problems for receivers of such investments, if their resources are disproportionally drawn out, and if the benefits of such investments are not properly shared. In addition, ignoring bad institutions in a search of natural resources could also pose serious problems in the future for investors from the South. Recently, a combination of bad institutions, growing strategic importance of natural resources, and large windfalls have led to the nationalization of oil and gas resources in Bolivia, Venezuela and Ecuador. In these instances, investors from the North have borne the costs. It remains to be seen whether these were isolated cases whether a perceived loss of control over natural assets, with implications for national security, will motivate other countries with poor property rights protection to renegotiate contracts signed with foreign investors with the aim of increasing the state control.
The emergence of new multinational corporations in the South does not displace other investors and, if anything, appears to be rather complementary to FDI from the North. Given our careful treatment of endogeneity, we can talk about a crowding-in of investment from the North by emerging country investors. We attribute this outcome to differences in investment behavior between developed and developing economies. 642 Column (1) presents estimation with an absolute institutional distance; (2) with positive and negative institutional distance. All models include time variant destination and source dummy variables. *, **, *** -statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively Columns 1, 2 and 5 are estimated by OLS and include the full set of year fixed effects; reported are robust standard errors. Column 2 contains the full set of country fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4 are estimated using the one-step generalized method of moments. Instruments in GMM estimation: time dummies and GDP growth. Statistical significance at * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%, respectively.
a Test of the hypothesis that the coefficient is greater or equal to one: P-value = 0.954. Test of the hypothesis that the coefficient is smaller or equal to one: P-value = 0.045. 
